不可高估台灣的重要性，更要為台灣淪陷預作佈局！

文/李忠謙導讀

《外交政策》刊出「棄台論」專文，呼籲華府放棄「台灣情結」

隨著川普 2.0 開始顛覆原有的國際秩序，白宮究竟會如何處理兩岸問題，已經成為台灣關注的國際焦點。最新一期《外交政策》刊出近似「棄台論」的專文〈台灣情結：美國戰略不該寄託在一場無法獲勝的戰爭〉，呼籲華府不要把台灣當成是亞洲戰略的核心、不要過度高估台灣的重要性，更要為台灣的可能淪陷預作佈局，盡可能降低中國統一台灣對美國的衝擊。

這篇堪稱「棄台論」最新代表作的長文，作者是美國智庫「國防重點」（Defense Priorities）軍事分析主任卡瓦納（Jennifer Kavanagh）與「卡內基國際和平基金會」（Carnegie Endowment forInternationalPeace）資深研究員沃海默（Stephen Wertheim）。兩人主張美國不該延續原來的極端親台路線，美國總統不該承受「為台北而戰」的巨大壓力，因為這麼做的代價令人畏懼、相關的政治算計更會讓美國陷入一場「打不贏的戰爭」。

卡瓦納與沃海默很清楚，坐視台灣淪陷將削弱美國政府的國際信譽，因此台灣的命運讓美國決策者夜不能寐。但這畢竟牽涉到二戰之後的首次大國衝突、甚至就連美國本土也可能陷於戰火，這些都是美國決策者必須權衡的代價。當然，如果美國能夠抵禦中國入侵台灣、保護印太地區重要的民主國家，如此偉大的成就必定載入史冊，詹森（Lyndon Johnson）當年也選擇了增兵越南，對抗越共的擴張與侵略。

但卡瓦納與沃海默不認為「不是引爆第三次世界大戰、就是眼睜睜看著台灣淪陷」的極端二元選項絕對不是個好主意，華府必須找出對台政策的第三條路，推動台灣增加國防支出、進行國防改革，讓台灣更具備自衛能力。這篇文章行文至此，與美國的既有政策差異不大，但兩位作者進而主張：如此一來，中國若是入侵台灣，美國就可以避免派遣軍隊保衛台灣、美國的基地也不致遭受攻擊，無論兩岸衝突的結果為何，都不會影響到美國在亞洲的地位。

卡瓦納與沃海默主張，美國的區域利益不應受到台灣命運的影響，華府不該澄清保衛台灣的承諾，更要淡化讓台灣落入北京手中的重要性。兩人駁斥「美國的生存與繁榮取決於台灣歸屬」的錯誤觀點，美國對台灣的支持應該有其限度，重點在於阻止中國入侵台灣的同時，更要積極維護美國的利益、避免捲入一場毀滅世界的戰爭。畢竟維護台灣事實上自治（de facto self-rule）所帶來的好處，不足以抵消美中戰爭造成的嚴重後果，美國在此區域的切身利益，是不讓中國成為不受約束的區域霸權，問題是北京掌控台灣，並不會造成美國所擔心的後果。

按照卡瓦納與沃海默的理路，他們承認美國與中國確實處於競爭關係，美國確實不可坐視中國在印太坐大，但達成這一點的關鍵並非不計代價地保護台灣。因為中國拿走台灣也不影響大局，無論是飛彈與雷達的涵蓋範圍、潛艦的匿蹤性，攻佔台灣所增加的軍事優勢並沒有想像中那麼大。卡瓦納與沃海默認為，對抗中國的重點應該擺在美國與其他印太重要國家的關係，即便台灣淪陷，美國仍然有能力組成一個制衡聯盟，阻止中國成為亞洲的政治和軍事霸權。

除了在軍事重要性上切割台灣，卡瓦納與沃海默認為在經濟利益上，美國也可以這麼做。主張強力支持台灣的美方國安官員往往認為，北京如果獲得台積電的控制權，可能會在科技戰中取得領先，華府將失去最重要的半導體來源，

美國的經濟成長和軍事創新都會受到嚴重打擊。但卡瓦納與沃海默指出，美國正在積極佈局國內的半導體產業，應對失去台灣的可能性，預計到了 2032 年，美國就可生產全球 28%的先進半導體，而且沒有西方在半導體產業鏈中的支援，台積電也根本無法營運，這些在中國入侵台灣後可能都會被立即切斷。

美國也沒有理由擔心，如果中國控制台灣，美國將失去進入東亞市場的機會。雖然中國可能擁有擾亂東海和南海航運的軍事能力，而且完全封鎖交通對解放軍來說也不是一件容易的事，何況中國自己的經濟也會受到影響。如有必要，日韓商船可以採取新航線，繞過南海，穿越印尼和菲律賓群島，或透過所羅門海繞過巴布亞紐幾內亞，即便失去台灣，東亞海運也不會完全受阻。

至於「美國要是不能為台灣而戰，就會損害美國的信譽，讓印太國家與中國走的更近」，這個觀點也被卡瓦納與沃海默所駁斥。因為就算台灣對美國當然很重要，也不足以成為美國與中國開戰的理由；加上印度和日本向來對中國抱持一定的敵意，對於中國的侵略行徑更會做出強烈反應。為了防止亞洲國家在台灣淪陷時與北京結盟，美國反而應該專注於其更大的目標——防止中國成為區域霸權。

對於台灣的防禦問題，卡瓦納與沃海默除了支持「豪豬戰略」—以大量反艦飛彈、水雷和防空系統盡可能武裝台灣，更重要的是「美軍不應參加戰鬥，盡可能遠離衝突」。兩位作者批評台灣的軍購策略側重購買大型先進裝備，因為解放軍可以輕鬆摧毀這些裝備，讓台灣失去進攻與防禦能力，台灣根本無法以這種方式擊敗中國，兩人更反對台灣將生存的希望寄託於美軍馳援—這正是兩人所反對之事。

卡瓦納與沃海默主張，台灣應該透過不對稱的拒止能力，阻止中國迅速佔領、將解放軍拖入一場漫長且代價高昂的戰爭。雖然拜登與上一屆川普政府都鼓勵台灣這麼做，但相關變革卻一直停滯不前。為了加大壓力，

美國領導人更應該公開表示，儘管《台灣關係法》規定了提供台灣防禦性武器的法律義務，但台灣對自身的防禦負有主要責任，進而施壓台灣將兵役延長為兩年、強化軍事勳練、國防預算至少提高到 GDP 的 4%、拒絕台灣對於戰機與軍艦的購買要求、甚至取消目前尚未完成交付的訂單。

為了避免捲入戰爭，卡瓦納與沃海默認為美國應當投資台灣的國防工業，使台灣在衝突期間也能自行生產彈藥、軍備與醫療用品，減輕美國國防工業的負擔，減少台灣對美國軍事援助的依賴。甚至在台灣遭到封鎖或處於交戰之際，美國也應當使用無人機運輸軍事物資，避免在運送物資時造成美方人員傷亡，一切都以「不要捲入台海戰爭」為最重要的目標。

卡瓦納與沃海默主張，美國的印太戰略應當不受台灣事態發展的影響，即便北京成功佔領台灣，華府也能最大幅度降低衝擊。華府不該一再警告「中國可能入侵台灣」，不該積極表達保衛台灣的承諾，因為這可能會促使美中捲入戰爭的風險。華府應該改變策略，不應計劃在台灣問題上與中國作戰，而是鼓勵相關國家做好自衛準備；更溫和與模糊地表明對台灣的軍事承諾，不要在兩岸問題上主動挑釁北京。華府應當認清，

亞洲的權力平衡並不取決於對台灣的控制，更重要的是美國與日本、印度、韓國、印尼和菲律賓的關係。

卡瓦納與沃海默認為，無論北京是否有所回應，美國都會因為加強「一中政策」受益。因為這麼做將向亞洲盟友表明，台灣並不是美國最關心的問題，兩岸局勢的進一步升級將來自中國的侵略，而不是美方的挑釁。雖然這麼做可能讓北京誤以為美國可能不會保衛台灣、從而削弱威懾力，但美國可以透過「戰略模糊」政策來限制這種風險，北京可能也會在侵略台灣時避免攻擊美軍。

自 2019 年以來，美國推出一系列敵視中國的政策，美中關係也逐漸惡化。但卡瓦納與沃海默建議美國的政治領袖，應該就美國在西太平洋的利益進行坦誠對話，美國民眾必須了解與中國發生衝突的真正代價：數十萬美國士兵戰死、在絕望中發射核武、日常生活被嚴重破壞、比金融風暴更嚴重的經濟衰退；在討論與中國競爭的必要性時，則應強調「與中國共存」的必要性，美國的決策者甚至應該改採「競爭性共存」作為美中關係的方針，避免對台灣問題過度危言聳聽。

卡瓦納與沃海默在文末指出，美國政府不應低估中國的威脅，但也應該瞭解失去台灣不會讓中國更危險。美國不該低估了自己在印太區域的優勢，台灣確實對美國有價值，但如果美國決策者高估了台灣的重要性，

可能會提高引爆毀滅性戰爭的重大風險，任何軍事力量都無法糾正此一錯誤。華府不應該因為恐懼或熱情而浪費自身優勢—無論台灣海峽發生什麼事，美國都可以跟盟友一起維護開放平衡的印太地區。

The Taiwan FixationAmerican Strategy Shouldn’t Hinge on an Unwinnable WarJennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim
March/April 2025 Published on February 25, 2025The fate of Taiwan keeps American policymakers up at night, and it hould.

A Chinese invasion of theisland would confront the United States with one of its gravest foreign policy choices ever.

LettingTaiwan fall to Beijing would dent Washington’s credibility and create new challenges for U.S. military
forces in Asia.

But the benefits of keeping Taiwan free would have to be weighed against the costs ofwaging the first armed conflict between great powers since 1945. Even if the United Statesprevailed—and it might well lose—an outright war with China would likely kill more Americans anddestroy more wealth than any conflict since the Vietnam War and perhaps since World War II.

Nuclearand cyber weapons could make it worse, bringing destruction on the U.S. homeland. These would becatastrophic consequences for the United States. As terrible as a U.S.-Chinese war would be, an American resident would face immense pressure tofight for Taipei. Many U.S. policymakers are convinced that Taiwan, a prosperous democracy in a vitalregion, is worth protecting despite the daunting price of doing so.

Political calculations may also push aU.S. president into war. By staying out, the president could expect to be blamed not only for permitting the economic meltdown that China’s invasion would trigger but also for losing Taiwan after a decades-long battle of wills between Washington and Beijing over the island’s future.

That would doom a president’s legacy. Against such a certainty, any chance of salvaging the situation could look like a better bet—and by opting to fight China to protect Taiwan, the president would preserve the possibility of going down in history as a great wartime victor. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson faced a choice between ramping up a U.S. military campaign in Vietnam and allowing the Communists to take over the country. He doubted that a war was necessary or winnable. But he sent American soldiers all the same. U.S. leaders need a way to escape the ghastly decision to either wage World War III or watch Taiwango down.

They need a third option. Washington must make a plan that enables Taiwan to mount a viable self-defense, allows the United States to assist from a distance, and keeps the U.S. position in Asia intact regardless of how a cross-strait conflict concludes. This way, the United States could abstain from sending its military forces to defend Taiwan if China invades the island and does not attack U.S. bases or warships. The Trump administration should launch an effort now to make this third option viable. Washingtonshould condition its aid on defense spending and reforms in Taipei, pushing Taiwan into a position tobetter protect itself. It must also develop capabilities and plans to resupply the island if needed. Yet U.S. policymakers must also accept that, without direct U.S. ilitary intervention, Taiwan maymanage only to stall a Chinese invasion, not repel one. The United States therefore needs to insulate its regional interests from Taiwan’s fate. Instead of clarifying its commitment to defend Taiwan, Washington should retain an ambiguous stance and downplay the importance of keeping the island out of Beijing’s hands. It should, meanwhile, bolster the self-defenses of its other Asian allies and partners, blocking any path for China to convert a successful bid for Taiwan into regional dominance. At home, U.S. politicians and analysts should speak frankly about the cost of a war with China and push back against the misguided idea that the United States’ survival and prosperity turn on Taiwan’s political status. Through a policy of firm but limited support for Taiwan, the United States can avoid involvement in a world-rending war while putting China off a risky invasion—and safeguarding U.S. interests if an invasion comes anyway. PRICING IN WORLD WAR III The United States rightly expends considerable resources to dissuade China from using coercion to control Taiwan. If China were to seize Taiwan, the United States would suffer significant military, economic, and reputational setbacks. China would gain a new foothold from which to project power across East Asia, complicating U.S. military operations in the region. Beijing could disrupt trade routes in the western Pacific, rattling the global economy. U.S. allies would have a new reason to question Washington’s commitment to their security. The repercussions would be greatest, of course, for the people of Taiwan, who would lose their vibrant democracy. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the benefits of preserving Taiwan’s de facto self-rule do not warrant the enormous human and economic costs of a U.S.-Chinese war. The United States’ vital interest lies in preventing China from attaining untrammeled regional hegemony in Asia. With such dominance, China could project large-scale military power into the Western Hemisphere or cut the United States off from Asia’s dynamic economic markets. But controlling Taiwan would not, in itself, transform China into a hegemon. The United States would remain capable of rallying a counterbalancing coalition to impede any potential Chinese bid for political and military supremacy in Asia.

For one thing, the military advantages China would reap from taking Taiwan would not be that profound, and the United States and its allies would have time to adjust. Beijing could use control of the island to expand the reach of its missiles, air defenses, radars, and maritime and air surveillance systems, allowing the People’s Liberation Army to operate farther from China’s coast and more easily hold at risk U.S. military assets, including bases in Guam and vessels near Japan and the Philippines.

But thePLA’s weapons can already reach these U.S. targets, so adding a few hundred more miles to their range would make only a marginal difference. China’s undersea gains would be similarly modest and unlikely to offset U.S. advantages.

Seizing Taiwan would allow China to dock submarines in the deepwater ports off Taiwan’s eastern coast, which would extend their range and enable them to avoid some U.S. underwater sensors in the Miyako and Luzon Straits.

They might not evade U.S. monitoring entirely, however, because satellites or sound surveillance in the region could probably detect them. Moreover, China may, in time, develop quieter submarines, and these could avoid U.S. detection without being launched from Taiwan. U.S. politicians should speak frankly about the cost of a war with China. Such limited operational gains would not give China the ability to bring about a dramatic regional expansion. Despite the fears of some in Tokyo and Manila, China would still face formidable obstacles to seizing outlying territories belonging to Japan or the Philippines—most of which are farther from Taiwan than Taiwan is from China—let alone more distant and populous islands, such as Okinawa or Kyushu in Japan or Luzon in the Philippines.

Furthermore, it would take China years to build the
infrastructure needed to use Taiwan as a base for military operations; the United States and its partnerswould have plenty of time to prepare additional defenses. In short, control of the island would hardlyoverturn the military balance in the region.

Countries threatened by China’s rise have to invest in security measures no matter what happens in and around Taiwan. If military considerations do not necessitate the direct U.S. defense of Taiwan, neither do the economic stakes.

National security officials who favor a strong U.S. commitment to Taiwan frequently cite their concern that China could commandeer high-tech assets on the island. Taiwan produces about 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips, largely through the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.

They argue that if Beijing gains control of TSMC, it could leap ahead in the global technology race, and Washington would lose its most important source of semiconductors, Constraining U.S. economic growth and military innovation. TSMC, however, cannot operate without Western components and intellectual property, both of which could be immediately cut off after a Chineseinvasion.

These steps, of course, would disrupt the United States’ own chip supply chains. Fortunately, the United States is already preparing for the possibility of losing access to Taiwanese production bybuilding semiconductor fabrication plants at home. Boston Consulting Group has estimated that the
United States is on track to produce 28 percent of the world’s advanced semiconductors by 2032.

The United States similarly has little reason to fear that it would lose access to East Asia’s valuableeconomic markets if China controlled Taiwan. China likely already has the military capability to disrupt shipping through the narrow sea-lanes of the East China and South China Seas, yet it has not done so. Fully blocking traffic would be expensive and time-consuming for the PLA, even if China controlled Taiwan, and China’s own economy would suffer, too. If necessary, commercial ships headed for Japan or South Korea could take new routes, bypassing the South China Sea by traveling through the
Indonesian and Philippine archipelagoes or around Papua New Guinea through the Solomon Sea. Some argue that the United States must fight for Taiwan because a failure to do so would undermine U.S. credibility, driving countries in the region closer to China. This seems unlikely. India and Japan, two of the United States’ cornerstone partners in the Indo-Pacific, have a deep history of animosity toward Beijing and tend to respond forcefully to Chinese aggression.

To prevent Asian countries from aligning with Beijing if it takes Taiwan, the United States should stop reinforcing the idea that its reputation hinges on the defense of Taiwan. Instead, it should focus on its larger objective—preventing Chinese regional dominance—and stake its credibility on that.

PLAYING PORCUPINE

Taiwan certainly matters to the United States—just not enough to justify a war with China. The U.S. government thus needs a new strategy to support the island’s defense without having American troops engage in combat. Of course, if China were to target American forces first, keeping out of the fight
would become impossible. But Beijing would have reason to refrain from attacking U.S. forces if it believed there was a good chance that Washington might abstain from conflict.

To make a Taiwan-led U.S.-supplied defense viable, the United States should adopt two policies over the next decade: insist
that Taipei reorient and step up its defense efforts, and improve the Pentagon’s ability to send military supplies to Taiwan during a conflict without putting Americans in harm’s way.

Taiwan’s current defense strategy leaves it unprepared for a Chinese attack. Taipei spends a significant share of its resources on advanced equipment, such as F-16 fighter jets, Abrams tanks, and submarines, intended to fight China head-on. Taiwan cannot defeat a Chinese invasion this way. China could easily find and destroy big assets, and its much larger military force would overwhelm any of these systems that survive an initial attack, leaving Taiwan without offensive firepower or sufficient defenses.

At that point, Taiwan’s survival would depend entirely on U.S. military warships and aircraft rapidly arriving and entering into the conflict—a massive gamble for Taipei and a devil’s choice for the United States.

Instead, as many analysts have argued, the best way for Taiwan to protect itself is to become a“porcupine” whose sharp defenses—large numbers of antiship missiles, sea mines, and air defensesystems, for instance—can thwart an invader’s attempt to absorb the island. With this asymmetric denialdefense, Taiwan’s military could prevent China from quickly seizing the island, dragging the PLA into a long and costly war that paves the way for a political settlement. Under the first Trump and the Biden administrations, Washington encouraged Taiwan to embrace such an approach, and Taipei made some progress, for example by investing in antiship missiles and starting to build a fleet of small drones.

But change has been halting and insufficient. The United States can spur Taiwan to acquire the capabilities it needs to become more self-reliant. Washington should clearly convey to Taipei that it will increase or decrease aid depending on how much Taiwan spends on its military and whether it invests in the right kinds of weapons and personnel to mount a denial-focused strategy. To turn up the pressure, U.S. leaders should publicly state that, although the United States has an abiding interest in maintaining the cross-strait status quo and a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to equip the island with defensive weapons, Taiwan bears the
primary responsibility for its own defense.

To receive the maximum U.S. assistance on offer, Taiwan should be required to increase its defense spending from the roughly two and a half percent of GDP it spends today to at least four percent by 2030—a level of expenditure on par with that of other countries in precarious security environments. Israel spends about five percent of GDP on defense despite being far stronger than any of its adversaries.

Poland and the Baltic states are working toward military spending of four percent of GDP even though they are protected by NATO’s security guarantee. Just as important, the United States should condition military assistance on the extent to which Taiwan uses its expanded budget to prepare a denial defense. Taiwan will need to triple or quadruple its arsenal of antiship missiles to have a chance at disabling a significant number of the vessels China would use to
move its forces onto Taiwan’s shores. Taipei should increase and modernize its stockpiles of naval mines, which would, in the event of an invasion, allow it to wreak further havoc on approaching Chinese ships. Taiwan should, at a minimum, double its supply of shoulder-fired and mobile air defense
systems and purchase or manufacture thousands of the munitions they need. It will also have to acquire tens of thousands of cheap drones that can harass PLA aircraft as they try to control the skies over the island. This would inhibit China from relentlessly bombing Taiwan’s critical Infrastructure or dropping paratroops inland. Finally, the United States should reject Taiwanese requests for big-ticket items such as aircraft and warships that would be easy targets for Chinese missiles and would be unlikely to withstand an initial Chinese attack. Washington should cancel unfilled Taiwanese orders for Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets and reallocate the funds to smaller, cheaper systems suited to a denial strategy. In addition to setting spending targets, the United States should demand that Taiwan improve its
military training so that it generates a large, reliable reserve force capable of holding off Chinese invaders. With enough skilled personnel, Taiwanese forces could occupy hardened positions along the island’s coast to prevent the PLA from amassing the numbers needed to break out from their
beachheads and seize and hold territory farther inland. Responding to internal and external pressure, Taiwan lengthened its conscription term in 2024 from four months to one year for all Taiwanese men born after 2005 and updated the curriculum for conscripts and reservists to include some live-fire drills. But much of this training remains divorced from the realities of warfighting. For example, it focuses on
the most basic military skills rather than offering the advanced field exercises that would prepare soldiers to operate in a conflict. In addition, only six percent of eligible conscripts reported for training last year; the rest received deferments to complete their education.

To get Taiwan’s reserve force to its necessary size and readiness, the Trump administration should press Taipei to require two full years of more intense instruction and limit the use of deferments. Controlling Taiwan would not, in itself, transform China into a hegemon.

The United States, for its part, must do all it can to equip Taiwan with asymmetric capabilities. Washington should make the island a priority recipient of arms sales, filling Taipei’s orders before thoseof other clients, just as the United States has done for Ukraine. U.S. suppliers can produce much of themateriel Taiwan needs most, such as antiship missiles, naval mines, and small air and sea drones, cheaply and in large quantities. The Biden administration transferred excess stocks of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, and the Trump administration should continue to do so. The United States should also invest in Taiwan’s defense industrial base so Taipei can produce and distribute munitions, spare parts, and
medical supplies around the island during a conflict.

This would also alleviate the burden on the United States’ own defense industrial base. Co-production arrangements and even joint ventures with U.S. firms could help Taiwan meet its needs. Taiwan should become as self-reliant as possible, but the United States may still need the capability to replenish Taiwan’s military stockpiles during a Chinese blockade or under Chinese fire—without bringing U.S. forces into the conflict.

Washington’s best option is to transport military supplies usinguncrewed systems, including aircraft, surface vessels, and undersea vehicles, because even if the PLA fired on them, the United States would suffer no casualties and could avoid entering into a war.

On the few occasions that adversaries have damaged U.S. drones, Washington has never retaliated with a direct
military strike.

During the war in Ukraine, for instance, a Russian fighter jet forced down a U.S. Reaper drone over the Black Sea, and the U.S. military did not respond. Uncrewed vehicles tend to be smaller than crewed ones, but they can still carry essential items such as ammunition, shoulder-fired and other small missiles, and naval and antitank mines. Some uncrewed
systems already exist: the U.S. Marine Corps has developed an autonomous vessel, modeled on the boats of drug smugglers, that can be remotely operated from thousands of miles away. The Pentagon should accelerate efforts to develop other such systems, working with traditional defense contractors and smaller startups to produce autonomous air and sea craft that can carry cargo. For now, the military infrastructure on Taiwan’s eastern coast is limited, making it difficult to receive
cargo during a war.

Taiwan should build additional runways, reinforced aircraft hangars, shelters for ships and submarines, and more extensive roads leading to the rest of the island. At the same time, the United States should expand current plans to stockpile military equipment at facilities near Taiwan, including in Guam, Japan, the Marshall and Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Philippines, and South Korea. Where necessary, Washington should seek explicit permission from host countries for the U.S. military to conduct resupply missions there. So far, no country in the region has clearly and publicly pledged to provide this type of support in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Some may be leery of getting pulled into a conflict with China, but U.S. officials should make clear that Washington, too, is seeking to avoid direct intervention.
SELF-DEFENSE CLASS In addition to reducing Taiwan’s dependence on U.S. military assistance, the United States should insulate its regional strategy from developments in Taiwan. That way, Washington can minimize the fallout in case Beijing succeeds in taking the island. In recent years, the Pentagon has adopted a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as its “pacing scenario,” the prospective future conflict on which U.S. budget and posture decisions are determined. Civilian leaders, meanwhile, speak more forcefully about their commitment to defend Taiwan than they did in previous decades. This approach has potential benefits.

Demonstrating U.S. readiness and resolve over Taiwan may deter China from attempting an invasion by suggesting that the price would likely be direct war with the United States. But it also raises the risk ofthe worst outcome: that China is provoked into war and the United States is compelled to join that warout of fear that its credibility is on the line. To avoid such a calamity, Washington should change tack.

The Trump administration should encourage countries in the region to become ready to defend themselves, and it should signal a more modest and ambiguous U.S. military commitment to Taiwan.

The balance of power in Asia does not hinge on control of Taiwan. More important are the United States’ ties to the major centers of economic and military power—Japan, India, and, to a lesser degree, South Korea—and countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines that are located on sea-lanes through which the United States gains commercial and military access to the region. Instead of planning to fight
China in a war over Taiwan, the United States should prioritize shoring up the self-defense capabilities of these partners. Over the past few years, U.S. efforts to strengthen allied militaries have emphasized Taiwan-related scenarios. In the Philippines, the United States has concentrated investments in defense infrastructure in Luzon, the main territory closest to Taiwan, where the United States hopes to base missiles and personnel in a conflict. U.S. officials have likewise encouraged Japan to purchase cruise missiles that are capable of striking China.

Yet Washington has paid insufficient attention to its allies’ most immediate security requirements. Manila needs to better protect bases and airfields across thePhilippine archipelago, and Tokyo should bolster its air defenses and build munitions stockpiles. The United States has also erred by expanding its military bases close to China and Taiwan. Washington has tried to gain more military access along the so-called first island chain, which encompasses the seas
closest to the east coast of mainland China. The United States has also pushed increasingly powerful military hardware in greater quantities close to Chinese shores. Washington would be better served, instead, by reinforcing existing infrastructure where it is most defensible. The U.S. military should enhance airfields and ports, logistics and supply hubs, and pre-positioned military equipment in northern rather than southern Japan, and along the so-called second island chain, including Guam, the Marshall and Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. China has fewer of the longer-range missiles needed to hit these distant and dispersed locations, making them more secure. By helping partners develop their own asymmetric defenses and protecting the U.S. military presence at better-defended bases farther from mainland China, the United States can both deter Beijing from widening a conflict over Taiwan and prevent it from achieving regional hegemony in any scenario, including if it gained control of the island. For similar reasons, the Trump administration should take a public stance on cross-strait issues that is less provocative than the Biden administration’s.

Over the last four years, the United States has effectively watered down its “one China” policy, which has long allowed Washington and Beijing to paper over their deep differences regarding Taiwan and avoid conflict. Under the policy, the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China, agrees not to challenge that position, and maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan. In the early months of the Biden administration, however, the State Department loosened restrictions on meetings between U.S. and Taiwanese officials. In 2022, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with Taiwan’s president in Taipei, becoming the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the island in 25 years.

Biden imself said on four occasions that he would order U.S. forces to defend Taiwan if China were to attack the island, a
departure from the usual stance of maintaining ambiguity over the U.S. response. Twice, he said it was up to the people of Taiwan to decide whether to declare independence, although he later returned to the customary position that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence. Many Asian allies worried that Washington’s actions provoked Beijing into cross-strait escalation, or at least handed Beijing a convenient justification for expanding its military activities around Taiwan. Trump and his team should be less assertive. If U.S. allies and partners deem the United States responsible for the outbreak of a Chinese-Taiwanese war—even if inciting a conflict is not Washington’s intent—they will be less willing to assist U.S. resupply missions and less likely to view
China as a threat to themselves. This perception would undermine the paramount U.S. objective of preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia.

Moreover, when allies see the United States stake its redibility on Taiwan’s political status, they, too, may come to see Taiwan’s defense as the litmus test of Washington’s commitment to the region.

It would be much better for the United States to set realistic expectations with its allies and partners, not to mention for itself. The United States should no longer let Taiwan policy come at the expense of regional strategy. Building
on the assurances exchanged between Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in November 2023, the new administration should make a determined effort to shore up the “one China” policy. Washington should remain ambiguous about whether it would defend Taiwan by force. It should consistently discourage unilateral Taiwanese moves toward independence and restore limitations on official U.S.-Taiwanese contacts.

The Trump administration should consider gradually removing the U.S. military trainers who have been working on Taiwan’s outlying islands since at least 2020; similar missions have been largely unsuccessful at teaching partners to become self-sufficient.

At the very least, the training could be carried out in a less sensitive place. The Trump administration could also offer new assurances, publicly or privately, that it will respect China’s redlines. For example, the United States could announce that under no circumstances would it support Taiwan’s independence, unless, perhaps, the island faces an
armed attack initiated by Beijing. In addition, Washington could affirm that it would accept any resolution of cross-strait differences, including unification, that is reached peacefully, without coercion, and with the assent of the people of Taiwan. The military gains China would reap from taking Taiwan
would not be that profound. These steps are best taken in return for corresponding Chinese actions, such as a reduction in military activities around Taiwan and a declaration that Beijing has no deadline for resolving the Taiwan question. Still, the United States would benefit from strengthening its “one China” policy regardless of Beijing’s willingness to reciprocate. Doing so would show U.S. allies and partners in Asia that Taiwan is not the United States’ overriding concern and that further escalation of cross-strait tensions would stem from Chinese aggression, not American provocations.

The main risk of this strategy is that it could weaken deterrence by suggesting to China that the United States might not defend Taiwan militarily. The United States can limit this risk by adhering to its traditional policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which entails remaining purposely vague about how the United States would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan.

Even if the United States does develop a viable option to aid the island without entering a war, Beijing should not discount the possibility that the United States might yet decide to fight. U.S. presidents will still face significant pressure to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan, from civilian and military advisers, Congress, and segments of the American public.

And by increasing its assistance to Taiwan and investing in its regional military capabilities, Washington could even strengthen deterrence. Beijing may nonetheless conclude that the likelihood of U.S. military intervention has somewhat diminished, but this calculation could have a bright silver
lining: believing it can keep U.S. forces out of a conflict, China would have less incentive to target American troops at the start if it did decide to invade Taiwan.

A different risk is that Taiwan could, in effect, arm itself too well: China, seeing that the possibility of ever unifying with the island is ending, might invade sooner to avoid losing the opportunity forever.

But it seems unlikely that Taiwan would strengthen its defenses so robustly as to persuade China’s leaders that the island had become irrevocably separate from the mainland. To be convinced to attack, Chinese leaders would have to conclude that Taiwan was about to outmatch China and would indefinitely sustain its military advantage.

Realistically, even major investments will enable Taiwan only to make an invasion slow, long, and costly, not to render coercive unification impossible.

Even if Taiwan turned itself into the ultimate porcupine, China would probably respond by improving its own capabilities—not by gambling on an invasion.

Furthermore, Beijing’s concerns should be mitigated by U.S. efforts to quell its fears. Taiwan may become materially better prepared to counter a Chinese attack, but Chinese leaders should not perceive any new challenge to their political claim to Taiwan.

On the contrary, they would see the threat subside as Washington takes greater care not to publicly challenge the legitimacy of Beijing’s territorial claim and aspiration for eventual unification. VIBE SHIFT To preserve their latitude in a Taiwan conflict and stay out of war, American policymakers won’t just need a new approach in the Indo-Pacific.

They must also change the conversation at home so that U.S. presidents do not fear political retribution for doing what best serves U.S. interests: avoiding war with China. Since 2019, American politicians, especially those in Congress, have pushed for a flurry of antagonistic policies that have created an atmosphere of hostility toward China. In such a climate, the
president and Congress may be more prone to taking up arms to defend Taiwan. As the political scientist Evan Medeiros has argued, developing a domestic consensus in favor of U.S.-Chinese coexistence is “not just a useful condition—but also a critical one—for avoiding conflict between these two geopolitical rivals.” Before the moment of crisis arrives, political leaders should initiate a frank national dialogue about U.S. interests in the western Pacific.

Americans must know the true costs of conflict with China: the deaths of tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, the possibility that nuclear weapons would be fired in desperation, an economic downturn dwarfing that of the Great Recession of 2008, and severe disruption to everyday life. It will take great effort for policymakers to communicate the scale of the potential devastation because a war with China would look nothing like the relatively small and
contained wars that the United States has waged in recent decades.

In addition to making clear the costs of war with China, U.S. officials should stress the need to coexist with China as prominently as they discuss the need to compete with it. In the coming years, especially if Beijing’s behavior improves, American policymakers should adopt “competitive coexistence” as an approach for U.S. relations with China.

In doing so, they would convey Washington’s willingness to
establish stable patterns of interaction, limit security competition, and address global problems collaboratively. At a minimum, political leaders should avoid undue alarmism about Taiwan.

The Bidenadministration was right to tamp down public speculation about the year by which China might intend
to launch an invasion.

The Trump administration should go further to discourage catastrophic thinking, including by communicating to the public that China would not pose an immeasurably greater challenge to the United States if Taiwan came under its control. The U.S. government should not underestimate the China threat.

A larger problem, however, is that the United States underestimates itself. Washington enjoys vast strengths and wide latitude in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The United States has forces patrolling the seas near China, not the other way around; it is an island 100 miles from the Chinese mainland that is in dispute.

Taiwan does hold value for the United States, but if U.S. policymakers overrate its importance, they will sacrifice the safety of the status quo for the perpetual risk of a devastating war. That would be an error that no amount of military strength could redress.

Washington should not squander its advantages out of fear or zeal. Together with allies and partners, the United States can preserve an open and balanced Indo-Pacific, regardless of what happens in the Taiwan Strait—but it needs to prepare now.