約瑟夫·奈：美國應該與中國打一場新冷戰嗎？
文/美中故事匯/約瑟夫·奈 文 張涓 譯
September 5, 2023
編輯按：美國布魯金斯學會近日邀請了幾位專家，討論美國是否應該與中國打一場新冷戰（Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?）。其中一位邀請的專家是哈佛大學甘迺迪學院資深教授、軟實力觀點的提出者約瑟夫·奈 （Joseph Nye）。《美中故事會》翻譯了他的開篇論點，以饗讀者。
中美之間的大國競爭是21世紀上半葉的一個決定性特徵，但對於如何描述這一特徵，學術界和政策界尚未達成共識。如果「冷戰」意味著激烈、長期的競爭，那麼我們目前就身處於其中；但如果這個詞被用作是對過去的歷史隱喻，那麼我們就不是處在一場冷戰中，不僅如此，我們還應該避免打一場新冷戰。
把目前的美中關係比作歷史上的美蘇冷戰，會誤導我們真正認清中國帶來的挑戰。美國和蘇聯在全球軍事領域緊密依存，但在經濟或社會方面幾乎完全相互隔絕。不僅如此，美中在氣候變化等生態領域相互依存的挑戰當時還不存在。從這些角度講，今天美國面臨的中國挑戰截然不同。
如果我們想在經濟上與中國完全脫鉤，我們、我們的盟友和第三國不可能不為此付出巨大的經濟代價。美國每年與中國的貿易額超過5000億美元，而中國已經學會了如何利用市場的創造力，以蘇聯從未掌握的方式來完善其國家治理。美國及其盟國並沒有受到共產主義輸出的威脅，而是受到美國和中國都可以操縱的經濟和政治相互依存體系的威脅。在安全問題上部分脫鉤或去風險是必要的，但全面的經濟脫鉤的代價將非常高昂，很少有盟友願意這樣做。值得一提的是，將中國當作主要交易夥伴的國家多於美國。
此外，氣候變化和流行病等相互依存的生態方面的挑戰有著物理和生物學特有的定律，這使得脫鉤根本不可能。沒有一個國家能夠單獨解決這些跨國問題。全球相互依存要求美國一方面要與其他國一起利用好各種實力，另一方面也要求美國能夠向其他國家施加這些實力。無論好壞，我們都陷入了與中國的「合作競爭」之中，我們需要一種能夠同時完成兩個目標的戰略。這不像冷戰時期的遏制。應對中國挑戰將需要一個更複雜的戰略，必須利用我們的盟友體系和基於規則的國際秩序。印度等盟友和夥伴是我們擁有但中國所缺乏的資源。儘管過去一個世紀經濟重心已從歐洲轉移到亞洲，但亞洲包括印度，它是中國的競爭對手，並不是盟友。此外，西方民主盟友的財富總和遠遠超過中國（加上俄羅斯）。
如果我們將戰略成功定義為像冷戰結束時蘇聯崩潰的方式來尋求改變中國，那麼我們很可能會失敗。儘管CCP害怕西方的自由化，但中國太大了，我們無法入侵或強迫中國進行國內變革，而反過來也是如此。從這個意義上說，除非我們陷入一場重大戰爭，否則中國和美國都不會對彼此構成生存威脅。最貼切的歷史比喻不是1945年的歐洲，而是1914年的歐洲。我們預期兩國會有低強度的經濟衝突，但我們的戰略目標應該是避免升級，維護盟友並確保我們在未來繼續發揮主導地位（但不是霸權）的國際機制。在這一點上，正如美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯曾提到的「和平共處」的口號所闡述的那樣。
鑒於中國實力的增長，這些戰略目標是否可行？答案是肯定的，如果我們出一手好牌的話，我們就會處於更強勢的位置。美國擁有重大的地緣政治優勢，中國不太可能取代我們的主導地位。從地理上看，我們瀕臨兩大洋，有友好鄰邦，而中國與印度、印尼、日本、馬來西亞、菲律賓、越南等國都存在領土爭端。我們的第二個優勢是能源：頁岩油氣革命使美國從能源進口國一躍成為出口國。另一方面，中國高度依賴通過波斯灣和印度洋的能源進口，而美國在這些地區擁有海軍優勢。美國還擁有人口優勢，未來十年勞動力可能會繼續增長，而中國的勞動力則將萎縮。中國的勞動適齡人口在2015年達到頂峰，而印度也超過中國成為世界上人口最多的國家。儘管中國在某些領域表現出色，但美國在生物技術、納米技術和資訊技術等關鍵技術方面仍處於領先地位。美國研究型大學在高等教育領域佔據主導地位，而中國還沒有一所大學能進入世界前二十名。總之，雖然中國擁有令人印象深刻的優勢，但也存在嚴重的弱點和問題。解決人口下降的辦法是提高生產率，但其生產率一直在下降，因為政府對私營企業人才的嚴格控制可能會削弱母雞下蛋的能力。
儘管美國握有一副好牌，但錯誤的戰略可能會導致我們拋棄盟友，摒棄國際機制，並嚴格限制移民。新加坡前總理李光耀表示，他不認為中國會超越美國，因為美國有能力吸引全世界的人才，並將他們的多樣性和創造力重新組合起來。鑒於其民族主義和政治體制，我們的開放程度是中國望塵莫及的。
我們對中國的戰略應該是利用威懾避免熱戰或冷戰，在可能的領域進行合作，並整合我們的資源以更有力地與之競爭。我們的戰略目標應該是通過加強我們的盟友和國際機構來塑造中國的對外行為。中國沿海第一島鏈的關鍵是日本。日本是美國的親密盟友，我們需要在那裡繼續駐軍。同時，我們要增強美國國內經濟和技術優勢。採取更積極的亞洲貿易政策是明智的，我們應該向轉向中國的貧窮國家提供更多的援助。我們必須保持美國國內開放和民主價值觀。民意調查顯示，這些價值觀賦予我們比中國更大的軟實力。美國加強對中國的軍事威懾受到許多希望與中國保持友好關係但又不想被中國主導的國家的歡迎。如果我們避免妖魔化和誤導性的歷史類比，我們就能制定出比新冷戰更有希望的戰略。
以下是英文原文：
Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?
The great power competition between the United States and China is a defining feature of the first half of the 21st century, but there is little agreement on how it should be characterized. If “Cold War” means intense prolonged competition, then we are in one, but if the term is used as a historical metaphor for the past, then we are not (yet), and should avoid it.
Analogies to the historical Cold War can mislead us about the real challenges we face from China. The United States and the Soviet Union had a high level of global military interdependence, but virtually no economic or social interdependence. Moreover, ecological interdependence such as climate change was not yet an issue. The China challenge today is quite different.
We cannot decouple our economy completely from China without enormous economic costs to us, our allies, and third countries. The United States does over half a trillion dollars in trade annually with China, and China has learned to harness the creativity of markets to authoritarian Communist Party control in ways the Soviets never mastered. The United States and its allies aren’t threatened by the export of communism, but by a system of economic and political interdependence that both the United States and China can manipulate. Partial decoupling or “de-risking” on security issues is necessary, but total economic decoupling would be very costly, and few allies would follow suit. More countries count China than the United States as their leading trade partner.
Moreover, the ecological aspects of interdependence such as climate change and pandemics obey the laws of physics and biology which make decoupling impossible. No country can solve these transnational problems alone. Global interdependence requires using power with others as well as over others. For better and worse, we are locked in a “cooperative rivalry” with China in which we need a strategy that can accomplish two contradictory things at the same time. This is not like Cold War containment. Meeting the China challenge will require a more complex strategy that leverages the alliances and rules-based system we created. Our allies and partners like India are assets that China lacks. While the center of economic gravity has shifted from Europe to Asia over the past century, Asia includes India, which is a Chinese rival, not an ally. Moreover, the combined wealth of the Western democratic allies will far exceed that of China (plus Russia) well into this century.
If we define strategic success as transforming China in a way similar to the collapse of the Soviet regime at the end of the Cold War, we are likely to fail. Although the Communist Party fears Western liberalization, China is too big for us to invade or coerce domestic change, and the reciprocal is true. In that sense, neither China nor the United States poses an existential threat to each other unless we blunder into a major war. The most apt historical metaphor is not Europe in 1945 but Europe in 1914. We should expect low intensity and economic conflict, but our strategic objectives should be to avoid escalation — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has used the slogan of “peaceful coexistence” — and to preserve the alliances and institutions that will continue our role as the leading (though not hegemonic) country in the future.
Are these strategic objectives feasible given the growth of Chinese power? Yes, because we have been dealt a strong hand if we play it well. The United States has major geopolitical advantages, and China is unlikely to displace us as a leading power. Geographically, we are bordered by two oceans and friendly neighbors, while China has territorial disputes with India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. A second advantage is energy: the shale oil and gas revolution has transformed the United States from an importer to an exporter. China, on the other hand, is highly dependent on energy imports passing through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, where the United States has naval supremacy. The United States also has a demographic advantage with a workforce that is likely to grow over the next decade, while China’s will shrink. China’s working-age population peaked in 2015, and India has passed China as the world’s most populous nation. And while China excels in some subfields, America remains at the forefront in the key technologies of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information technology. American research universities dominate higher education while no Chinese universities rank in the top twenty. China has impressive strengths, but also serious weaknesses and problems. The answer to its demographic decline is to increase productivity but total factor productivity has been dropping, and tight party control of private entrepreneurial talent may weaken the geese that lay golden eggs.
While the United States holds high cards, a misguided strategy could lead us to discard our aces of alliances and international institutions or severely restrict immigration. Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said he did not think China would surpass the United States because of America’s ability to draw on the talents of the entire world and to recombine them in diversity and creativity. Given its ethnic nationalism and party state, this kind of openness is not possible for China.
Our strategy toward China should use deterrence to avoid either a hot or cold war, cooperate when possible, and marshal our assets to compete successfully. Our strategic objective should be to shape China’s external behavior by strengthening our alliances and international institutions. The key to the first island chain off China’s shore is Japan, a close American ally where we station troops. At the same time, we should bolster our economy and technological advantages at home. A more active Asian trade policy would be wise, and we should offer assistance to poor countries being wooed by China. We must maintain our domestic openness and democratic values that polls show have given us much greater soft power than China. Strengthening our military power of deterrence is welcomed by the many countries that want to maintain friendly relations with China but do not want to be dominated by it. If we avoid demonization and misleading historical analogies, we can manage a strategy that holds more promise for us than a new cold war.
